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Este artículo relocaliza el análisis de la violencia en Palestina dentro de un marco alternativo que subra-
ya los procesos de la colonización global. Empezando desde la premisa de que Palestina es un sitio no de
un “conflicto” sencillo, sino un proyecto continuo de colonialismo de asentamiento (el sionismo), el artí-
culo destaca la situación actual como artefacto de las estructuras profundas que había planteado este pro-
yecto. Utilizando las obras de Paul Virilio como clave teórica, explora la incrustación microcosmica y
profética de Palestina dentro de tres modos coloniales: la exocolonización (la colonización de territorios
externos), la endocolonización (la colonización de poblaciones específicas dentro de su proprio territorio
en el contexto de la guerra permanente o “pura”), y la dromocolonización (la colonización de la huma-
nidad por la aceleración tecno-científica). Estos tres modos no solamente aclaran los métodos específi-
cos y coloniales del sionismo (e.g., la exclusión y confinamiento de los palestinos), sino también nos
empuja a pensar fuera de las concepciónes agente-centricas de la política y considerar el impacto de los
procesos (e.g. militarización o aceleración) que salgan fuera del control de los actores racionales. En par-
ticular, vemos cómo Palestina se ha convertido en un laboratorio de nuevas formas de guerra y control
social cuyas implicaciones globales no se puede sobreestimar. Teniendo esto en cuenta, el artículo ter-
mina con el argumento que la consideración de los desafíos y las posibilidades de la descolonización en
Palestina nos ayuda imaginar el significado de la descolonización global. 
PalabRaS clavE: Colonialismo de asentamiento, colonización, globalización, Israel/Palestina, violen-
cia, descolonización.
abStRact
This article seeks to relocate the analysis of violence in Palestine within an alternative paradigm that
emphasizes long-term processes of global colonization. Beginning from the premise that Palestine is a
site of an ongoing settler-colonial project (Zionism) rather than a simple “conflict,” it views contemporary
realities as overdetermined by the deep structures that this project has put in place. Using the work of
Paul Virilio as a key theoretical touchstone, it explores Palestine’s microcosmic and often prophetic
embeddedness in three overlapping colonial modes: exocolonization (the colonization of territories
outside one’s own), endocolonization (the colonization of specific populations within the territory under
one’s control in the context of permanent or “pure” war), and dromocolonization (the colonization of
humanity by techno-scientific acceleration). Examination of these three modes not only sheds light on
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Zionism’s specific colonial practices (e.g., the exclusion and confinement of Palestinians), but also
encourages us to think beyond actor-centered conceptions of politics and consider the impact of
processes (e.g., militarization or acceleration) that stretch beyond the control of rational actors. In
particular, we see how Palestine has become a laboratory for new forms of warfare and social control
whose global implications cannot be overestimated. With this in mind, the article concludes by arguing
that an exploration of the challenges and possibilities of decolonization in Palestine can help us think
through what global decolonization might mean.
KEywoRDS: Settler colonialism, colonization, globalization, Israel/Palestine, violence, decolonization
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SEttlER coloNialiSM aND global
coloNizatioN
It is a truism of international politics that
Israel/Palestine is one of the world’s perpetual
«trouble spots,» an exceptional place of “hot
contestations” (Stetter, 2008) in the form of
seemingly unending violence, enmity, and
hopelessness. Over the years, the considerable
weight of institutionally-supported public discourse
has had the sedimentary effect of reducing the
entire dynamic to a single phrase: «the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.» Most journalists, scholars,
government officials, and other observers who
speak and write about the situation tend to use
this piece of shorthand reflexively, a sure indication
that it has achieved the status of Gramscian
“common sense.” The phrase “Israeli-Palestinian
conflict,” however, is both inaccurate and
misleading for the simple reason that what is
happening in Israel/Palestine is not a «conflict.» 
To make such a claim is not to deny that there
are two or more parties engaging in a sustained,
often violent dispute over territory and sovereignty
in Palestine. Using the term «conflict» in this
case, however, encourages us to believe that the
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians
is, in some basic way, a relationship between two
“sides” that have equal roles in the situation. This
assumption is false, on one level, because there is
a great imbalance in the relative ability of each
“side” to inflict violence: Israel is by far the
stronger party. But it is also false on a much more
fundamental level because it obscures the fact
that Israel/Palestine is the site of an ongoing
project of settler colonialism. This project has
put into place a set of political, economic, and
social structures that form the basis of the current
relationship between Israeli Jews and Palestinians,
including the violent aspects of that relationship.
These structures are, to quote the editors of an
important comparative volume on settler
colonialism, “the persistent defining characteristic,
even the condition of possibility,” of a settler
state such as Israel (Elkins and Pederson, 2005:
3). In other words, rather than a “conflict,” what
is happening in Israel/Palestine is Zionism. 
The deep structural nature of settler colonialism
finds its clearest and most provocative scholarly
explication in the work of Patrick Wolfe, who
argues persuasively against the conventional
understanding of settler colonialism as a temporary,
episodic process. This dominant perspective is
framed by the teleological narratives associated
with European expansion and nation-building; by
the state-centered and actor-centered orientation
of the social sciences; and by the systematic
devaluation of explanatory paradigms rooted in
indigenous and, more generally, subaltern
experiences. For Wolfe (2006), settler-colonial
invasion is properly viewed as “a structure rather
than an event” (402). In seeking to create a new
(settler) society in place of an existing (indigenous)
one, he argues, settler colonialism reveals its sine
qua non: the radical, long-term, and permanent
structural transformation of the territory in question. 
This alternative perspective dovetails perfectly
with the viewpoint of indigenous people such as
John Trudell, former national spokesman for the
American Indian Movement. In a single,
devastating observation included in a 2005
documentary, Trudell effectively encapsulates
the interpretation that the dominant framework
so urgently seeks to deny: “We have never really
seen the war go away” (Rae, 2005). In Trudell’s
world, all of those processes that tend to be
separated artificially in social science literature –
colonialism, war, capitalism, ecological destruction
– are fused into a single amalgam that describes
not a phase in a linear process defined by European
categories, but rather the very reality that continues
to structure all of our lives more than 500 years
after the Columbian invasions set modern
globalization in motion (Hall, 2003). 
The symmetrical language of a “conflict”
between two “sides” is thus fundamentally
incompatible with the realities of settler
colonialism. Throughout the decades-long struggle
for majority rule in South Africa, for example,
there undoubtedly were those who preferred to
view the violence there as a kind of zero-sum
game between two opposing sides. Yet from a
settler-colonial perspective, it is clear that the
violence was a direct function of the structures
put into place, quite openly, by the white
government, structures that positioned all South
Africans in a complex set of social relationships
organized according to a logic of strict, racialized
hierarchy. What was happening was not a
“conflict” – what was happening was apartheid.
South Africa’s black population did not enter
into a violent relationship with the white settlers
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willingly; they did so because the territory they
inhabited was being colonized and they needed
to defend themselves against a political project
that was increasingly bent on subjugating,
displacing, and killing them. By any reasonable
calculation, the settlers bear the bulk of the
moral responsibility for initiating this system of
structural violence. Equally important, there is
no question that these structures have outlived
the era of formal apartheid (Daniel, Southall,
and Lutchmann, 2005); despite the country’s
undeniably important and inspiring transition to
democracy, there is nothing temporary about
settler colonialism in South Africa.  
We see a very similar dynamic at work in the
United States and Australia, two locations where
the white settler population carried out a genocidal
process of territorial conquest, provoking
understandable resistance from those who were
being removed from their land and homes, stripped
of key aspects of their culture, and killed in large
numbers. The violent structures put in place by
settler colonialism in these “new world” territories
continue to shape social reality today, as even a
brief look at basic socioeconomic indicators for
native and non-native populations reveals. To
refer to this dynamic, whether historically or
currently, as a “conflict” would not only be
inaccurate; it would also be an insult to the
indigenous people who, along with millions of
enslaved Africans brought to North America
against their will, were the primary victims of
settler colonialism in these two territories. 
In contextualizing Palestine in this way, I am
drawing on a growing literature that examines
Palestine both comparatively and globally through
the paradigm of settler colonialism (Piterberg,
2008; Rodinson, 1973; Shafir, 1996; Veracini,
2006; Wolfe, 2006). How did the Palestinians
become involved in this so-called «conflict» with
Zionism and, later, the state of Israel? The answer,
quite simply, is that they became involved because
they were already living on the land when the
settlers arrived. Consequently, any discussion of
Israel/Palestine that does not acknowledge the
settler-colonial nature of the situation is an exercise
in denial (Cohen, 2001) that is likely to lead to a
fundamental misunderstanding of what has already
happened, what is happening now, and what needs
to happen in order to create a more just future for
all who live there. 
In this article, I seek to locate the analysis of
contemporary Palestine not only within the context
of settler colonialism, but also in relation to three
overlapping modes that constitute the deep
structures of what amounts to an ongoing process
of global colonization: exocolonization,
endocolonization, and dromocolonization. Rather
than the kind of ideal types that tend to populate
the scholarly literature on colonialism, these
modes represent global impulses and vectors that
cut across a range of specific examples, sometimes
sequentially and sometimes coterminously. As
such, they enable us to lift Palestine out of its
exceptionalist prison and place it in a more global
context in a way that reveals not only Palestine’s
embeddedness in long-term historical processes,
but also its often prophetic role as a laboratory
pushing these processes forward (Collins, 2007).
My primary purpose in employing these modes
is thus to provide a heuristic perspective from
which to engage in a principled critique of
contemporary social reality. 
This critique draws extensively on the work of
Paul Virilio, whose underappreciated writings on
global politics enrich significantly our understanding
of the kinds of processes under discussion here. A
sustained engagement with these writings enables
us to see global colonization as more than a simple
process of expansion undertaken by empires and
modern nation-states driven to seek the “endless
accumulation of capital” (Wallerstein, 2004: 24).
What emerges in Virilio’s work is a recognition
that semi-autonomous processes of social
acceleration and militarization are also central (if
often unacknowledged) motors driving global
colonization. Taking this perspective seriously
not only transforms our understanding of Palestine;
it also sheds new light on the kinds of challenges
and possibilities facing those who seek to address
the persistent injustices and inequalities that Palestine
shares with the rest of the world. 
ExocoloNizatioN: thE
gEoPoliticS of ExPaNSioN aND
EliMiNatioN
Virilio uses the term exocolonization to refer
to a process of geopolitical expansion that rushes
literally to the ends of the earth – the “blank
spaces” on the map famously described in Joseph
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Conrad’s childhood recollections and later by
Marlow, his narrator in Heart of Darkness –
with the primary goal of incorporating and
exploiting territory, labor, resources, and other
factors necessary for the stockpiling and
generation of wealth. As Marlow says matter-
of-factly, “It was just robbery with violence,
aggravated murder on a grand scale, and men
going at it blind…not a pretty thing when you
look into it too much.” The sheer number of
types of colonialism found in the highly taxonomic
literature on the topic – settler, exploitation,
metropole, maritime, dependent, administrative
and so forth – can be bewildering,1 but all of
them have played their role in the global operation
of this exocolonial mode. The story of this process,
as scholars of global political economy have
demonstrated, is organically related to the story
of how the modern world system emerged through
the intertwining of the history of capitalism and
the history of empires and, later, the interstate
system. 
It would be a mistake, however, to assume
that a mode of colonization most commonly
associated with the age of imperialism, industry,
and “discovery” has passed firmly into history.
On the contrary, as Derek Gregory (2004)
illustrates, evidence of the “colonial present” is
all around us. In addition to Gregory’s chief
examples (Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq),
the continuing presence of resource wars in
Africa and elsewhere is a further indication of
the same pattern (Klare, 2002). Recent reports
of countries such as South Korea and the United
Arab Emirates buying huge tracts of prime
farmland in poor countries at bargain prices
remind us that exocolonization also takes on
subtler, less visible forms.2 All of this makes
abundantly clear that even in a supposedly
“postcolonial” era, the externally-directed
geopolitical vector of colonization remains an
active element in global politics with the potential
to inflict tremendous damage on vulnerable
communities. 
The origins of settler colonialism belong
firmly in the mode of exocolonization, with
settler projects constituting important thrusts in
the trajectories of imperial expansion. In some
cases these projects were absolutely central to
the direct prosecution of imperial aims, while in
other cases settlement was a means to resolve
the demographic, economic, and political
contradictions that empire produced in the
metropolis. Settlers often enjoyed the crucial
backing of the imperial state (particularly its
military power), but occasionally found
themselves at odds with that state at key moments.
In all cases, however, the core dynamics of
settler projects were deeply immersed in the
political economy and geopolitics of
exocolonization, in particular the modern
dynamics of state formation, racialization, capital
accumulation, and genocide.
In addition to what Wolfe terms a general
“logic of elimination” aimed at reducing the
indigenous presence through a variety of
mechanisms (killing, forced removal, biocultural
assimilation), settler colonialism is also
characterized by a logic of expansion that structures
its particular spatial politics, most notably the
violent exocolonial politics associated with the
frontier. Rather than a fixed location, the settler-
colonial frontier is best conceived as a peripatetic
structure that facilitates territorial acquisition
through the creation of paramilitary vanguards
(the frontier “rabble”); the systematic fostering
of fear and insecurity in the settler population as
a perpetual justification for further conquest;
and the strategic use of legal “gray zones” where
“frontier justice” can be dispensed with relative
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1 From a poststructuralist perspective, the frequent use of binary oppositions in this literature reveals the inherently
problematic nature of the strict taxonomic approach to studying colonialism.  Udo Krautwurst (2003) argues that such taxonomies
betray the desire to establish a “pure positivity [that] also requires an act of exclusion” (56).      
2 While some might argue that such actions fall outside the realm of colonization, it is worth remembering that “legal” land
purchases have long played a role in many colonial projects (including the Zionist project in Palestine).  This is an excellent
example of why it is important to stretch one’s angle of vision beyond the state-centered frameworks created and dominated by
elites.  The land purchasers, in this case, are not engaged in a full-scale process of colonizing the distant territory and would thus
dispute the application of the colonial label to their actions.  For smallholders in that territory, however, the situation may look
quite familiar.  The point is that the global structures that constitute the conditions of possibility for such a situation are, in and of
themselves, colonial structures.   
impunity. Within the ideological framework of
settlement, the frontier becomes the site of heroic
figures and events (e.g. the Afrikaner “Great
Trek,” the westward migration of North America’s
European settlers, the “reclaiming” of biblical
territory by Jewish settlers) that form the iconic
bedrock of nationalist mythology. 
The Zionist project nonetheless emerged and
grew in the midst of a world dominated by the
exocolonial impulse and was deeply shaped by
the realities of that world. The role of 19th-
century anti-Semitism in creating the conditions
for the emergence of Zionism is well known. An
additional factor was the influence of European
ethno-nationalism, which not only highlighted
the difficulty (and, some argued, the impossibility)
of Jewish assimilation but also shaped the form
that both Zionism’s settler-colonial response to
anti-Semitism and the Arab response to European
domination would take. Despite starting at the
end of the period of open exocolonization,
Zionism had more in common with older cases
of what Elkins and Pederson call “new world”
colonization efforts in Australia and North
America, where “Republican freedom and band-
of-brothers exclusivity [constituted] the entangled
twin ideological poles of the settler colonial
state” (18). 
More generally, Elkins and Pederson argue
that all settler projects share two key characteristics
that are clearly identifiable in the structural logic
of the Zionist project. The first is the particular
four-sided set of relationships among external
imperial powers, their local representatives, the
settler community, and the indigenous population.
For exocolonizing European powers, Zionism
served as a useful tool for outsourcing the “Jewish
question” while simultaneously aiding broader
imperial goals. At the same time, the fact that the
Zionist settlers had their own exocolonial agenda
– the extension of Jewish settlement and
sovereignty throughout as much of historic Palestine
as possible – meant that like settlers in other
“new world” situations, they often came into
tension and conflict with the imperial metropole.
In this sense, Palestine was a site where multiple
exocolonial agendas met, sometimes in harmony
and sometimes in dissonance. 
The second structural characteristic is the set
of privileges enjoyed by the settlers vis-à-vis
the colonized. In the case of Zionism, these
privileges were cemented as part of the process
of transforming Jews from a victimized minority
into a colonizing minority through the perpetuation
of the structural logic of anti-Semitism (Massad,
2005). The work of the Israeli sociologist Gershon
Shafir (1996) remains a crucial touchstone in
illuminating the concrete conditions under which
this transformation took place. In particular,
Shafir identifies three related processes that
animated the period of early Zionist settlement
(1882-1914) and laid the foundation for Israeli
state and nation formation: the “conquest of
labor” strategy (often articulated in terms of
“Hebrew labor”) that led to the hegemony of the
labor movement in Zionist/Israeli politics; the
“conquest of guarding” strategy that fueled
structures of vanguardist militarization; and the
“conquest of land” strategy, actualized most
notably in the creation of Jewish-only collective
farms (kibbutzim) that turned workers into
agricultural settlers. These three strategies of
conquest, Shafir argues, combined to produce a
national political culture dominated by the
philosophy of militant settlement and the principle
of Jewish exclusivism.3
Without the removal of a significant portion
of Palestine’s Arab population, however, these
strategies could not have borne fruit in the form
of a majority-Jewish state. The Nakba (literally
“the catastrophe,” the name Palestinians give to
their dispossession in 1948-49) thus represents
the central element in Zionism’s use of the
exocolonial mode. If, as Frantz Fanon famously
argued, all colonialism is inherently violent,
examples such as the Nakba demonstrate that
from the perspective of indigenous populations,
settler colonialism is cataclysmically violent.
By 1949, more than 500 Palestinian villages
and nearly a dozen urban neighborhoods were
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3 While Shafir views the category of settler colonialism as eminently applicable to the case of Zionism, he also distances
himself from authors such as Edward Said and Maxime Rodinson, accusing them of placing too much emphasis on an allegedly
inexorable logic of settler colonialism.  For Shafir, the Zionist settler colonization of Palestine was not inevitable but rather the
result of a contingent and complex set of material processes addressed in his book.  
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emptied of their inhabitants, and roughly 750,000
people were made refugees in what the Israeli
historian Ilan Pappe (2006) calls “a clear-cut
case of an ethnic cleansing operation, regarded
under international law today as a crime against
humanity” (xiii). 
While nationalist Israeli historiography initially
managed to marginalize important Palestinian
accounts of the Nakba and to occlude what Shafir
refers to as the obvious “demographic interest”
behind it, evidence that Israel’s founders actively
sought the very demographic reversal that the
war effected is now overwhelming. The current
division is between those scholars, like Pappe,
who object to this “ethnic cleansing” on moral
grounds and those, like Benny Morris, who
employ an exceptionalist rhetoric of necessity
to justify the massacres and expulsions that
facilitated Israel’s emergence (Shavit, 2004). In
this sense, despite the fact that Zionism has
become deeply marked by the second and third
modes of colonization discussed in the remainder
of this article, it continues to be haunted by the
contradictions and uncomfortable truths that its
original exocolonial venture produced. 
ENDocoloNizatioN: thE Social aND
EcoNoMic logic of “PURE waR”
With its roots in an impulse toward territorial
acquisition, exocolonization tends to be associated
with what might be called “extensive” (that is,
outwardly-directed) forms of exploitation such
as those that take place along the perpetually
expanding “frontiers” created by settler-colonial
projects. At the same time, given the terrestrial,
ecological and ethical realities involved in this
kind of exploitation, exocolonization is always
confronted by limits that threaten to derail it.
The most obvious of these is the limit imposed
by the size of the planet itself – at a certain
point, Marlow’s map contains no more “blank
spaces” – but we may also speak of limits in the
availability of specific resources, the rate of
return on investment, and the willingness of
populations at home to support the kind of
structural violence (including, at the extreme,
genocidal violence) that exocolonial projects
typically inflict upon their objects. All such
projects, of course, face various forms of
determined resistance from the populations
being colonized. In short, colonizers who employ
the mode of exocolonization never operate with
an entirely free hand. 
These limits help explain the existence of a
second mode, endocolonization, which effectively
represents the inversion of the first mode: a
colonizing vector that is directed inward and
involves more “intensive” forms of exploitation.
While also arguably present in earlier periods
(e.g. during the process of European nation-
formation), this mode finds its most hospitable
home in a post-1945 geopolitical environment
marked by the existence of nuclear weapons, the
associated doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and
the growing role of supranational institutions
(e.g., the World Bank) in establishing and enforcing
new hegemonic standards of social restructuring.
A fundamental yet frustratingly opaque concept,
20th-century endocolonization can be defined
most concisely as the socioeconomic logic of
what Virilio calls pure war – that is, the endless
preparation for war that occurs as the process of
militarization is extended throughout the social
body (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997). 
In an economic sense, endocolonization feeds
the machine of pure war and the structures,
profits, and privileges associated with it by
extracting resources from particular local
populations that have already been incorporated
into the “postcolonial” state; as such, it constitutes
a massive transfer of wealth and energy from
individuals and communities to a military-
industrial complex that represents one set of
institutional faces of the “war machine” about
which Deleuze and Guattari wrote so
provocatively. At the extreme, endocolonization
signals the existence of a kind of “suicidal state”:
a systematic underdevelopment not of some
distant territory, but rather of one’s own economy
through policies of privatization and the
withdrawal of social services (Virilio 1998). 
The social logic of endocolonization tells us
a great deal about how global colonization has
transformed the nature of war and, by extension,
the character of human communities. Specifically,
endocolonization operates by promoting a
generalized militarization of identity and social
consciousness – the creation of “civilian soldiers”
(Virilio and Lotringer, 1997: 26) – through the
gradual fusion of science, technology, information,
and economy. In the words of Arthur Kroker
(1995), this fusion produces “the crystallization
of science as the language of power, of the
depletion of the energies of society, and their
draining away into the war machine.” This unique
and frightening system of permanent warfare
hides, in effect, in plain sight, defining the horizon
of observable and thinkable social reality. 
As an example, consider the phenomenon
that Ross Glover (2002) provocatively calls the
logic of “the war on ________.” During the past
half-century we have seen how this logic produces
open-ended global campaigns against a host of
vaguely-defined enemies (crime, drugs, terrorism,
etc.), campaigns that facilitate the spread of
militarized structures, practices, and identities
across the social field. These “wars on,” argues
Glover, ultimately serve as euphemisms for an
ongoing war against the poor – that is, an
endocolonization of the livelihoods, communities,
and the very bodies of the most vulnerable
(Feldman, 1991; Virilio & Lotringer, 2002). In
keeping with the broader social function of
endocolonization, they also provide ready-made
platforms for the creation of new scientific
knowledge and new technologies (e.g., biometrics,
data mining, surveillance techniques) and their
diffusion into a wide range of military and social
control applications. 
Significantly, the “wars on” are also built
upon assumptions about the pathological nature
of the “cultures” that allegedly support the
vaguely-defined enemies being fought. In this
sense, the reductionist arguments often mobilized
under the banner of the “global war on terrorism”
about the violent or undemocratic nature of
Islam (as if “Islam” were a unitary, unchanging
social fact) are close cousins of the “cultures of
poverty” arguments that have long served to
deflect attention from the structural nature of
poverty. In a kind of discursive sleight-of-hand,
the obsessive focus on “culture” in this rhetoric
also serves to hide the constitutive role that
science, technology, and war (perceived
incorrectly as distinct and disinterested entities)
play in the processes of endocolonization. 
Needless to say, the modes of exocolonization
and endocolonization are as organically related
as the major and minor modes in a musical score.
In many cases, as suggested above, the latter
emerges as the former reaches its limits. For
metropole colonizers (e.g., the British Empire),
the extraction of wealth from foreign territories
may be followed by withdrawal and the inward
turn of the colonizing vector (e.g., Thatcherism).
For settler colonizers (e.g., the white settlers in
South Africa or North America), the successful
creation of a new society is typically followed
by the confinement and systematic structural
exploitation of the remaining subaltern population
(e.g., the South African “homelands,” the Jim
Crow South, the “prison-industrial complex”).
Finally, for many of those societies that gained
independence from their colonial rulers (e.g.,
Argentina or Zaire), decolonization ushered in a
period of endocolonization in the form of military
dictatorships and “kleptocracies” supported and
enabled (openly or covertly) by powerful external
forces. 
The significant distinctions between these
first two modes of colonization can be mapped
out usefully along a number of axes. Spatially,
whereas exocolonization plays itself out in struggles
over the incorporation of distant territories often
viewed as “empty” spaces (e.g., on Marlow’s
map), endocolonization produces desperate, often
hidden struggles over spaces that are simultaneously
overcrowded, abandoned, and stigmatized: urban
ghettoes, slums (Davis, 2006), decaying industrial
zones, reservations, today’s Gaza Strip.4 Militarily,
exocolonization’s “war of milieu,” enacted in the
relatively isolated military “theaters” of land and
sea, gives way to endocolonization’s “war on the
milieu” enacted against the very habitats that
host and sustain life (Virilio, 1998: 30). Likewise,
the means of violence and their implications
change dramatically: exocolonization is aided by
guns, ships, maps, machetes, and other implements
that facilitate expansion, while endocolonization
occurs under the shadow of aerial warfare, the
Bomb, and the claustrophobic techniques of urban
social control. 
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4 Interestingly, such abandoned zones are often described in the “violent cartographies” (Shapiro, 1997) of elite policy
discourse in striking, often racialized terms that recall Marlow’s classic exocolonial map, where the “blank” place quickly
becomes a place of “darkness” and “horror.”  Thus we find growing references to “black spots,” “no-go areas,” and the like.  
Palestinians and Jews emerged from the era
of inter-imperial total war (arguably the apotheosis
of the exocolonial impulse) as populations whose
shared vulnerability derived directly from the
perpetuation of European anti-Semitism. Through
the creation of the Israeli state in the aftermath
of the Holocaust, many Jews found a way to
avoid continuing on the path of what Giorgio
Agamben (1998) calls “bare life,” only to become
“civilian soldiers” in a garrison state awash in
both traditional, sovereign war and the more
saturating practices of pure war. When that state
reached the geographical limits of its exocolonial
project in 1967, it did so as a new member of the
nuclear club. Under the nuclear umbrella and
Israel’s military domination of the newly-captured
territories, the lives of everyone in Israel/Palestine
were transformed in ways that are consistent
with the realities of endocolonization. Already
oriented toward the preparation for war, Israel’s
economy became partially dependent on
Palestinian labor (though much less so than was
the case in apartheid South Africa) and even
more dependent on militarization in the form of
perpetual counter-insurgency and, more recently,
the high-tech repressive and disciplinary practices
of “homeland security” (Klein, 2007). These
later developments have coincided with a turn
toward neoliberal restructuring that has had deep
and predictable effects (Clarno, 2008; Nitzan
and Bichler, 2002). 
For their part, Palestinians who experienced
violent deterritorialization in 1948 found
themselves at the mercy of generally unwelcoming
Arab governments and also subject to the kind
of liberal humanitarianism (symbolized by FDR’s
“freedom from want”) that easily slid into a
coercive structure designed to keep them “barely”
alive and politically neutered (Collins,
forthcoming; Peteet, 2005). After 1967, those
living under Israeli control found that
endocolonization initially meant being ensnared
in a system of labor exploitation that involved
not only the family disruption associated with
migrating to work in Israel, but also the indignity
of working to build a new society for others on
the ruins of their own (Tamari, 1981). Over
time, changes in Israeli economic and security
policy, combined with the consolidation of Israel’s
exocolonial hold on the West Bank and East
Jerusalem, left Palestinians confined to smaller
and smaller areas and, in the case of Gaza, reduced
to “bare life” guaranteed only by humanitarian
assistance and the digging of tunnels under the
border with Egypt. 
Equally important, having already been test
subjects for an international order that constructed
refugees as threats to state sovereignty while
also leaving them vulnerable to state violence
(Benhabib, 2004; Nyers, 2006), Palestinians
also became early targets of what would eventually
be known as the “global war on terrorism.” The
latter campaign, which is deeply shaped by the
interests of settler states and their collapsing of
external and internal security (Virilio, 1998),
has already had devastating consequences for
Palestinians (Gregory, 2004). In short, the entire
post-Nakba era has coincided with the
(re)emergence of an endocolonizing mode that
has left Palestinians more confined, their political
dreams perpetually “deferred” in the manner
described in Langston Hughes’ famous 1951
poem on the black American underclass. 
DRoMocoloNizatioN: aN EMERgENt
aND coNfiNiNg REality
Both exocolonization and endocolonization,
of course, are aided by capital. The ability of
capital to produce a single world-system,
combined with the role of nuclear deterrence in
enabling endocolonization under a single
apocalyptic umbrella, points us toward a creeping
politics of acceleration and closure that emerges
fully in the third mode of colonization. Following
Virilio’s crucial work on dromology (literally
the logic of the dromos or the race), I will refer
to this third mode as dromocolonization. In the
first place, the term refers to the fact that
colonization (like power itself) is inherently
“dromocratic”: the advantage typically lies with
those who are most effectively able to control
the strategic acceleration and deceleration of
violence and change. In many cases, the colonizer
is the one who has the ability (by virtue of superior
technology) to go the fastest and therefore leverage
acceleration to his benefit. In other cases, the
colonized (e.g., in the form of guerrilla armies)
may be able to gain the upper hand by tapping
into dromocratic power through lightning-quick
assaults and retreats. One could thus argue that
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this mode is immanent to any actor-centered
conception of colonization. 
A full understanding of dromocolonization,
however, requires that we also go beyond actor-
centered theories and their emphasis on
intentionality. If we step outside these theories,
we can also see dromocolonization as the
colonization of humanity itself by techno-scientific
acceleration – in short, the rule of acceleration.
On this view, acceleration constitutes a semi-
autonomous force in politics that evades, in
many ways, the structures of human control
(Der Derian, 1990; Virilio, 1986). For this reason,
to adopt Raymond Williams’ classic terminology
from the field of cultural studies, I argue that
dromocolonization is best viewed as an
“emergent” reality in relation to which the other
two modes appear increasingly “residual,” co-
existing uneasily with dromocolonization while
always threatening to be eclipsed by it. 
One important characteristic of this emergent
reality is that, much like globalization itself, its
effects are profoundly uneven. To say that
acceleration is colonizing humanity is not the
same as saying that all human beings experience
this process in the same way. For those who are
immersed on a daily basis in the accelerated
circuits of social media, compulsory multitasking,
and “real-time” instantaneity, dromocolonization
may appear as a nagging sense that the rhythm
of life is steadily changing in a way that leaves
one perpetually out of breath and unable to
focus.5 Others, however, may experience
dromocolonization in a radically different way:
when their village is hit without warning by a
missile fired from a pilotless aircraft representing
a postmodern war machine with the “ability to
descend from nowhere without notice and vanish
again without warning” (Bauman, 2001: 15);
when their life savings disappears in an instant
thanks to a financial crash fueled by lightning-
quick, computer-aided trading patterns; or when
false information about them spreads like wildfire
through the information superhighway faster
than it can possibly be corrected. 
A second important characteristic of
dromocolonization is that because it is a truly
global process, it begins to take us beyond the
question of who is being colonized by whom.
For example, in the realm of political violence,
there is no question that non-state forces (e.g.,
those who are the primary targets of the “global
war on terrorism”) are now fully capable of
moving at least as quickly as traditional military
forces. Some might view this development as
evidence that dromocratic power (traditionally
vested in the state) is weakening, and to a limited
extent this is accurate. Yet the entire violent
dynamic pitting states against these non-state
groups leads one to suspect that all of these
actors are being driven by the logic of acceleration
as much as (or more than) they are driving it. 
The traditional tools of social analysis are
insufficient to make sense of this process. With
their focus on territory, our frameworks for
understanding politics remain very geo-centric
in a way that fails to grasp or explain how
acceleration is changing the very nature of space
and arguably effecting the subordination of space
to time (Der Derian, 1990). This is not to say
that space and place no longer matter; on the
contrary, we are all witnessing and participating
in a struggle between the deterritorializing vectors
of dromocratic globalization and the human
desire to inhabit, defend, and derive meaning
from particular spaces. 
All three modes of colonization I have
described here are important elements of this
struggle, but they diverge in a number of key
respects, perhaps most notably in their
mechanisms of displacement. Exocolonization
and endocolonization tend to displace individuals
and communities from one geographical space
to another through genocide, voluntary or forced
removal, the creation of diasporas, de-
peasantization and urbanization, and the creation
of ghettos and other confined spaces. Settler-
colonial exocolonization, for example, removes
indigenous people from the land (or from a
particular kind of relationship to the land) and
pushes them into cities or onto reservations.
Endocolonization begins by bringing citizens
under the “protective” cover of the state, only to
remove that cover systematically, leaving them
5 Such experiences among relatively well-to-do members of the global community have produced a range of efforts designed
to slow down the pace of life (Honoré, 2004).  
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to flee into spaces defined by various forms of
fundamentalism (including, of course, market
fundamentalism). In other words, both modes
deterritorialize, but they also reterritorialize –
albeit in ways that enact new hierarchical
structures. 
Dromocolonization, by contrast, operationalizes
the logic of acceleration in politics and takes it to
its extreme by displacing people from space into
time. In a planetary sense, all human beings are
indigenous people for whom dromocolonization
represents a direct attack on any meaningful
relationship with place. In Virilio’s memorable
phrase, it combines with the globalization of
insecurity to produce the “bewildered flight of
civilian populations in the ‘territories’ of the
media,” with the media understood as a literal
no-place (utopia).6 At the extreme, there is no
reterritorialization. 
These processes may also be expressed,
historically and quite pessimistically, as a story
of the rise and fall of democratic politics.
Exocolonization was, in part, about creating the
conditions for the creation of democratic
institutions and the selective provision of
democratic privileges (e.g. to the white, male,
propertied citizen). Endocolonization created the
social conditions within which to extend these
privileges to others (e.g., the formerly colonized,
racial minorities) at precisely the time when
popular sovereignty was starting to be superseded
by global structures such as the Bretton Woods
institutions. Finally, dromocolonization pushes
humanity toward the eclipse of democracy by
gradually eliminating the time for reflection and
popular mobilization, leaving us to drown in the
world of instant communication while the world
around is buffeted by forces that seem to be
beyond anyone’s control.7
While there may be ways in which
exocolonization, endocolonization, and
dromocolonization emerge and operate sequentially,
the greatest value of the framework I have been
describing lies in helping us understand those
cases where the three modes are operating
coterminously. Palestine is one such case, but we
might also point to those parts of contemporary
Africa where nomadic “war machines” are
exercising new forms of accelerated “necropolitics”
(Mbembe, 2003). The forces of violence in these
locations are not simply operating dromocratically
in the wasteland left by a past colonialism; they
are deeply connected with ongoing vectors of
exo- and endocolonization. The three modes of
colonization combine to fuel patterns of resource
extraction that are deeply familiar, yet also
somehow novel in their particular execution. 
In Palestine, as I have argued elsewhere
(Collins, 2008a and 2008b), dromocratic violence
– that is, violence that both uses and is used by
acceleration – has played a key role in the
continued prosecution of Zionism’s settler-
colonial project, not least in Israel’s longstanding
ability to leverage its considerable advantage in
the technologies of ground and aerial warfare.
At the same time, Palestinians have also sought
and found ways to employ forms of accelerated
violence that represent concrete mechanisms
through which Palestinians have been gradually
displaced from geopolitics into chronopolitics.
The hijacker of the early 1970s, for example,
responded to deterritorialization by choosing to
inhabit, in effect, the virtual territories of the
global media (Virilio, 1990), while the suicide
bomber responds to what Ghassan Hage (2003b:
78) calls a “premature social aging” that imposes
a particularly terrifying form of existential
acceleration on a colonized population for whom
death is always nearby. Both actions constitute
powerful “media spectacles” (Kellner, 2003),
simultaneously keeping alive an insistent
expression of Palestinian political will while
also collaborating unwittingly with Zionism to
push forward the dangerous politics of
dromocolonization. 
Meanwhile, the decades-old struggle against
the more traditional kinds of geopolitical
displacement fostered by exocolonization
continues in the form of place-based resistance
on the part of ordinary Palestinians who seek to
6 For Virilio, the political implications of this process are stark and catastrophic: by pushing the people to occupy a world of
instant and endless real-time communication, it produces “a popular opposition that is no longer located anywhere” (Virilio,
1990: 63).
7 For a useful discussion of how acceleration is disrupting the basic structures of liberal democracy, see Scheuerman (2004).  
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defend their land, trees, and homes. These efforts,
however, are taking place within shrinking
conditions of possibility thanks not only to settler
colonialism’s spatial politics but also to the
effects of dromocolonization. One of Virilio’s
most important insights is that acceleration
produces various forms of confinement. The
intense confinement that Palestinians experience
while living under Israeli domination is partly a
function of literal enclosure (Clarno, 2008)
achieved through land confiscations, checkpoints,
and the construction of Israel’s “separation
wall.” It is also, however, a function of the high-
tech, dromocratic umbrella that Israel has
constructed in order to enable the efficient
surveillance of Palestinian communities, the
remote scanning of Palestinian bodies, and the
lightning-quick assassination of Palestinian
militants (Klein, 2007; Li, 2006). 
Despite their privileged position within the
settler-colonial structure, Israeli Jews are not
unaffected by the processes of dromocratic
confinement. On the contrary, confinement is
arguably one of the most salient elements that
they share with their Palestinian counterparts,
albeit in ways that are obviously unequal and
hierarchical in their execution. With its deep
immersion in the phenomenon of pure war
described above, Israel has long subjected its
population to a kind of ideological confinement
via the kinds of “pathological insecurity” that
are endemic to all settler projects (Goldberg,
2008: 38), a sense of insecurity that is aided by
the willingness of some Palestinians to employ
dromocratic violence. In a further form of
confinement, the families that populate Israel’s
West Bank colonies live in what Eyal Weizman
(2002) calls “panoptic fortresses” and “cul-de-
sac envelopes,” benefiting from a special network
of “bypass roads” that speed them to their jobs
inside Israel in a way that undoubtedly makes
an already small territory seem even smaller. 
DEcoloNizatioN: a global
oPPoRtUNity
What this dromological dynamic indicates is
that the entire struggle over settler colonialism
in Palestine is increasingly colored by the violent
politics of acceleration even as it remains
immersed in the modes of exo- and
endocolonization. Like settler colonialism itself,
to return to Patrick Wolfe’s observation, these
modes produce structures, not simply “events.”
Understanding the depth of these structures is
crucial if we are to grasp one of the cardinal
realities governing the situation: as the product
of these structural transformations rather than a
temporary colonial relationship, the “problem”
of Palestine was never meant to be “solved” – at
least not in the conventional sense. What, then,
might decolonization mean in Palestine in the
21st century? Can we even speak of decolonization
in such a context? 
Our current understanding of decolonization
is obviously a product of the world-historical
changes that saw much of the so-called “Third
World” achieve formal independence from
colonial rule in the years following 1945. In
Israel/Palestine, the fact that Jewish settlers and
their descendants have no clear “mother country”
to return to has led to the increasingly widespread
acceptance of the “two-state solution” that would
create a Palestinian state on the territories occupied
by Israel in 1967. One of the primary political
advantages of this “solution” is that while it
holds out the promise of a certain kind of
decolonization (in the form of national sovereignty
over part of Palestine) to Palestinians, it does so
from within the “conflict” framework with which
I began this article. Israeli Jews who support the
two-state solution are thus able to maintain their
denial of the colonial realities that surround
them. 
Unfortunately, the two-state solution has
been rendered thoroughly unworkable by those
very colonial realities and their geopolitical
manifestations. Specifically, by settling its Jewish
population throughout historic Palestine – a
process that continues as of this writing through
the expansion of Jewish colonies in and around
East Jerusalem – the state of Israel has effectively
confirmed Palestine’s status as a single polity
marked by the differential provision of rights to
its inhabitants on the basis of ethno-religious
identity. Carving a viable, truly sovereign
Palestinian state out of this territory, as even the
most well-meaning political negotiators have
discovered, appears to be an impossible task;
the only imaginable result is a hierarchical political
arrangement in which Palestinians remain subject
to Israeli political, economic, and military
domination while Israeli Jews continue to enjoy
the colonial privileges they have come to expect. 
These developments have produced what
Ilan Pappe (2008) calls a sense of “navigation
fatigue” among liberal Israeli Jews who find
themselves occupying a shrinking ideological
space as they are forced to confront the exclusivist
nature of their national project. Pretending that
one can embrace this project while rejecting
exclusivism – by allowing for a nominally
“independent” Palestinian state in a small fraction
of historic Palestine – is less and less of an
option at a time when the Israeli government is
carrying out policies that leave it increasingly
vulnerable to comparisons with apartheid South
Africa. What this means is that some traditional
supporters of Israel (both inside and outside the
state) are starting to break free of Zionism
altogether, while others are embracing openly
the racist logic of exclusion long associated
with right-wing Zionists who advocate the
expulsion or further disenfranchisement of Israel’s
Palestinian population and the annexation of
additional territory to the state. 
The ground has also been shifting among
Palestinians and their international supporters.
Specifically, the growth of a global solidarity
movement in the past decade has coincided with
a significant turn away from the old national
liberation model focused on the taking of state
power and toward an anti-apartheid model focused
on the creation of a single, democratic state for
all who live in Israel/Palestine (Abunimah,
2006; Makdisi, 2008; Tilley, 2005). This “one-
state solution,” while still lacking support among
policy elites, is nonetheless much more in tune
with the realities of settler colonialism. The
global boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS)
movement represents a further step in this
direction by seeking to leverage the nonviolent
power of civil society against Israeli colonization
in much the same way that international pressure
hastened the downfall of formal apartheid in
South Africa. 
All of these emerging elements in the
longstanding struggle for justice in Palestine
have come under sustained critique not only
from strong supporters of Israel, but also from
those within the struggle who have strategic
objections to BDS and those who view the actions
of some international solidarity activists on the
ground in Palestine as counterproductive.
Nonetheless, what I want to suggest here is that
we are seeing the early signs of a collective
recognition that 21st-century decolonization in
Palestine – or anywhere else – means, first,
addressing all of the deep structures of global
colonization and their many interlocking
manifestations (militarization, deterritorialization,
neoliberalism, ecological destruction); and second,
fostering what is, in effect, a kind of “Fourth
World” (that is, indigenous) consciousness (Hall,
2003). 
As Trudell’s observation about permanent
war indicates, indigenous people – the original
victims of settler colonialism – never had the
luxury of seeing war as separate from capitalism
or environmental degradation. Like all those
who find themselves targeted by colonialism,
they are typically constructed in dominant
discourses as “underdeveloped” and needing to
“catch up” to their colonizers; yet the reverse is
more likely to be true. Globalization and global
colonization, in this sense, provide an opportunity
for all of us to “catch up” to those who have
never stopped being indigenous. 
What might this mean, in practice, for Palestine?
It would mean continuing to foster connections
between the “place-based yet transnationalised”
(Escobar, 2004: 223) struggle on the ground in
Palestine and the broader movement for global
justice, a movement crystallized in the emergence
of the World Social Forum. It would mean
searching for liberating alternatives to the models
that continue to inform the actions of nationalist
elites who seek state power in Palestine at the
cost of meaningful social transformation. It would
also mean supporting the efforts of those who are
experimenting with new forms of ecological (in
the broadest sense) resistance not only to Israeli
colonization, but also to the deep structures of
global colonization discussed here. 
Given Palestine’s ongoing status as a prophetic
political laboratory, a successful shift toward
“Fourth World” thinking there would have
significant global consequences. Nor would it
be the first time that settler colonialism has
played such a role. Older settler-colonial cases,
for example, have given the world a complex
and ongoing legacy in a number of areas, two of
which are worth highlighting here. First, white
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